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Abstract:  
We examine an economy where professionals provide services to clients and where a 
professional can sell his practice to another. Professionals vary in quality, and clients in 
their need (or willingness-to-pay) for high-quality service. Efficiency is measured as the 
number of matches between high-quality professionals and high-need clients. However, 
agent types are unobservable a priori. We find that trade in practices can facilitate the 
transmission of information about agent types. In general full efficiency is achieved, but 
equilibrium is not always robust to random shocks. A tax on the sale of practices 
ensures the existence of robust, efficient equilibria. 
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1 Introduction
We examine a market for professional (legal, medical, dental, etc.) services. We
are interested not only in the interactions between professionals and their clients,
but also in the phenomenon of “selling one’s practice,” which happens when one
professional refers his clients to another professional, who pays a sum of money in
exchange for this referral.
Such a transaction presents an interesting information problem. When a practice
changes hands, the clientele is aware of the change in ownership and is free to take
its business somewhere else. Clearly, for a practice to have value (over and above the
value of its physical assets), the new owner must be confident that the clientele will
remain. But why should it, if the new owner’s quality is not observable? Another
fact which needs to be explained is that not all young professionals starting out in
the business choose to buy practices. Some elect to build up their clientele from
scratch. What are the main factors underlying this decision?
The fact that clients choose to remain with the new owner of a practice, rather
than take their business elsewhere, could be interpreted as inertia on their part,
due to search or switching costs. However we believe that an additional explanation
needs to be explored, one having to do with information and uncertainty. Perhaps
high-quality professionals are more likely to buy practices than low-quality ones. If
this is the case, then the purchase of a practice constitutes a signal of high quality,
which would explain why clients choose to stay.
In our model, professionals are either high-quality (H-professionals, or H-pros for
short) or low-quality (L-pros). Clients are either type-A (A-clients) or type-B (B-
clients), A-clients being the ones with the higher willingness-to-pay for high-quality
services. These types are unobservable, but a professional and client do learn each
other’s types after they have transacted once. In that sense, professional services
are an experience good. For simplicity we assume that each professional serves only
one client at a time.
An efficient equilibrium maximizes the gains from trade, which in this case means
maximizing the number of A-H matches, i.e. matches between A-clients and H-pros.
The potential role of practices is to facilitate the creation of such matches.
In this paper, selling a practice means selling the right to negotiate with an A-
client.1 This is not as simple as “selling the client.” Here, once a practice changes
hands, the client is under no obligation to transact with the new owner: she may,
if she wants, take her business elsewhere. This raises a number of questions. First,
why would a professional buy a practice if there is no guarantee that the client will
stay? Second, why would a client stay in a practice if there is no information about
the new owner? Third, how can any of this be efficient?
1Practices consisting of B-clients are also possible, and will be discussed at the end of the paper.
Including them does not have a qualitative impact on results, though, mainly because A-practices
and B-practices are distinguishable on the market and sell for different prices. A professional
wishing to be matched with an A-client purchases an A-practice, whether B-practices exist or not.
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To put things in perspective, we first study a version of the model without the
buying and selling of practices. In this case the market is generally inefficient: young
high-quality professionals have no way of signalling their type, so many of them end
up with B-clients; similarly, A-clients have no way of screening professionals, so
many of them end up with L-pros. Efficiency is only obtained when there is a
multitude of A-clients, enough to hire all young professionals and retain the services
of the high-quality ones for a second period.
When practices are introduced, there is always an efficient equilibrium. When
A-clients are scarce relative to H-pros the equilibrium is separating, in that only
H-pros buy and sell practices. The price at which practices are traded is relatively
high, so buying one is only profitable to a professional if he intends to keep it for a
long time (two periods, in our model). But keeping a practice for a long time means
renewing his business relationship with his client even after the client has gotten to
know his type. This is where high-quality professionals have an edge. An L-pro can
buy a practice and, for a time, pretend that he is high-quality; but eventually (after
one period) his true type becomes known to the client, and the game is up. Because
of this, L-pros cannot profitably hold on to practices for more than a period, so they
do not buy any. Buying a practice is a signal of high quality.
When A-clients are scarcer the efficient equilibrium is semi-pooling: All H-pros
buy practices, but some L-pros do so as well. The signal is diluted: when a practice
is bought, the client cannot be one hundred percent sure that the new owner is
high-quality. But in equilibrium the probability is high enough that she chooses to
stay.
We next see if these results are robust to the introduction of a shock. Specifically,
we force a fraction of the professional population to leave the economy in mid-career,
giving them the opportunity to sell their practices (if they have any) before they
go. This is meant to depict a real-life occurrence, namely that people commonly
relocate to other areas, for a variety of reasons. We find that some of the semi-
pooling efficient equilibria found earlier are robust to this shock, while separating
ones are not. In the latter case, we also find that a tax on the sale of practices in
mid-career (i.e. a tax from which retiring professionals would be exempt) can be
used to restore efficiency.
1.1 Related Literature
The early literature on reputation focuses on long-lived agents and does not consider
reputation as an asset that can be traded between firms (see Fudenberg and Tirole,
ch. 9, for a presentation of this literature). Kreps (1990) is the first investigation
of reputation trading and shows that there exists an equilibrium where reputation
is a valuable asset that provides incentives to short-lived firms to exert more effort.
However, this reputation equilibrium is one among many and is as likely to happen
as less favourable ones.
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Tadelis (2002) extend Kreps’ setup to inves-
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tigate the incentive aspect of reputation trading. They consider a heterogeneous
set of firms, composed of inept (low-type) and competent (high-type) firms. The
latter can choose to exert an effort to increase the probability of providing a high-
quality service (a “success;” as opposed to a low-quality service, a “failure”). They
show that reputation trading gives incentives for competent firms to exert effort.
As in Tadelis (1999, 2003), they also investigate the ability of reputation trading to
operate as a screening device between low-type and high-type firms.
In these studies there is a clear distinction between a firm’s name and its owner’s
identity. Also it is assumed that customers cannot observe changes in firm owner-
ship. The name’s past performance (or reputation) is publicly known, i.e. customers
and entrepreneurs know if the services provided by each name in the past were suc-
cesses, failures, or any sequence of those events. This name’s record determines the
price that the owner of the name can charge customers, and thereby, the price of
that name on the name market. They show that good reputations cannot serve
as sorting devices that separate high-type from low-type entrepreneurs: there is no
equilibrium in which only high-type entrepreneurs buy good reputations. Indeed, if
good reputations were only bought by high-type entrepreneurs, customers’ expecta-
tions about the quality of the firm’s services would not be violently shaken by the
occurrence of a failure, making a good reputation very valuable to low-type firms.
As high-type entrepreneurs are more likely than low-type ones to be successful in
building their own name, they would value a good name less than their low-type
counterparts, and so customers’ expectations would not be rational. In two recent
studies, Deb (2012) and Wang (2011) obtain similar results with observable changes
in name ownership.
As in Deb (2012) and Wang (2011), we assume that a professional’s record is
not public information: only clients who have benefited from his services in the past
know the professional’s type. The main difference of our setting compared to this
literature is the heterogeneity of clients and the asymmetric information between
professionals and clients regarding client types. This makes the purchase of practices
more attractive to high-quality professionals than when only reputation effects are at
work. Moreover, we introduce a role for government in promoting efficiency through
taxation.
Developing an approach somewhat close to ours, Hakenes and Peitz (2007; HP
hereafter) find that, for certain parameter values, reputation is tradeable, i.e. that
a competitive market allows high-value practices to be sold only to good profes-
sionals. This result is obtained by imposing rather strong assumptions regarding
what doctors (professionals) can observe and what they can do. In HP’s model,
doctors selling practices can observe the types of those buying them; and since in
equilibrium good doctors only sell their practices to other good doctors, patients
can deduce that if their previous doctor was good then their new one must also
be good (and similarly for bad doctors). In our model, doctors cannot observe one
another’s types, and so patients cannot make this kind of inference. Furthermore,
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in HP’s model, doctors can only sell their practices when they retire, not before.
Combined with the previous assumption, this means that there is no opportunity in
HP for a bad doctor to buy a high-value practice, pass himself off as a good doctor,
and resell the practice for a high price before its value has had a chance to diminish,
i.e. before the clientele has had a chance to react to the deception. There is, in
other words, very little chance of adverse selection. In our model the possibility
of such duplicity is one of the main obstacles to efficiency. Good doctors will sell
practices to and buy practices from bad doctors: the only things that matter in
these transactions are the types of clients involved (the real value of the practice)
and asking price. And patients will not automatically distrust their new doctor
if their previous one was bad, since neither doctor’s type has any bearing on the
other’s. Our setup is much more vulnerable to adverse selection; in fact, there are in
our model Akerlof-type pooling equilibria in which practices are worthless and not
traded, because patients would not trust the doctors who bought them. Compared
to HP, then, the conditions for efficiency and for separating equilibrium are more
demanding in our setup.
Another difference between the two models is that in HP, prices for services are
fixed, and an exogenous switching cost is introduced to prevent clients from seeking
new doctors. In our model, prices are fully endogenous and it is these prices which
determine whether a patient will stay with his doctor or leave him; there are no
switching costs.
A more distantly related paper is Garicano and Santos (2004). In that study,
agents (akin to our professionals) are either high-skill or low-skill and draw oppor-
tunities (akin to our clients) of uncertain value. One of the decisions they must
make is whether to deal with these opportunities themselves or refer them to other
professionals in exchange for some compensation. Their notion of efficiency, the
matching of high-skill agents to valuable opportunities, is the same as ours. How-
ever, the parallel ends there. The paper studies transactions among professionals,
but does not go into the professional-client relationship; in fact, their opportunities
are not decision-makers at all. The interdependence of the two kinds of relationships
(professional-professional and professional-client) is crucial to our analysis.
To our knowledge, none of the existing literature considers a shock such as
the one we investigate. And none considers taxation as a tool for bringing about
efficiency, as we do.
2 Benchmark: The Model Without Practices
To give a sense of how the economy functions in our model, we first present a version
in which clients hire professionals, but professionals do not buy or sell practices.
Much of the reasoning presented here will be used in later sections. For clarity,
when a professional and client meet, we will refer to the professional as “him” and
to the client as “her.”
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2.1 Setup
Time elapses discretely without beginning or end. We are interested in steady-state
equilibria. The market is for services, which are provided by professionals (or pros)
and purchased by clients. We do not call them buyers and sellers, to avoid confusion
with the buying and selling of practices, discussed later. All agents are risk-neutral
and have a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Professionals enter the economy, work for two periods, then retire, in overlapping-
generations fashion. That is, at the start of each period, a measure 1 of young pro-
fessionals enter the economy; those who were young in the previous period (also a
measure 1) now become old; and those who were old in the previous period (again, a
measure 1) now retire. Hence there are always a measure 2 of working professionals
in the economy, half of them young, half of them old. Retiring professionals do not
play a role in this section, but they will later, when we consider the sale of practices.
This age structure is meant to mirror reality in a simple way. Professionals do need
to begin their careers without having had the chance to establish a reputation; and
eventually they do retire, possibly selling their practices, a way of cashing in on
accumulated reputation.
Each generation of professionals is composed of a measure q of high-quality (type-
H) professionals and a measure 1 − q of low-quality (type-L) ones. These qualities
are exogenous and fixed: a professional is born with a certain type, and stays that
way. Each professional has one indivisible unit of service for sale in each period;
that is to say, he may see only one client per period.
There are of two types of clients, A and B. Type-A clients value high-quality
services more than type-B clients do, in a way which will be specified shortly. Clients,
unlike professionals, are infinitely-lived.2
There is a measure ψA of type-A agents and a measure ψB of type-B agents
present in the economy at all times. We also assume that ψA + ψB > 2, i.e. that
clients outnumber working professionals. This seems reasonable, since in reality a
large segment of the population does not actually purchase professional services;
everyone, however, is a potential client. The case where ψA + ψB ≤ 2 can also be
worked out, with more elaborate proofs and calculations, but with the same general
results. Some features of the ψA +ψB ≤ 2 case are discussed towards the end of the
paper.
Types (A, B, L and H) are private information, as are past histories. Once a pro-
2This assumption is made for mathematical convenience. It would be possible to consider the
case where each period a client may disappear for exogenous reasons (and be replaced by an
identical one who enters the market). As long as this probability of disappearance is relatively low,
the properties of the equilibria we derive in the following would not be affected. Alternatively, we
may consider that clients have finite lives. In that case, practices (introduced in Section 3) would
be assets whose values decline over time. The price of a practice, which (as will be shown) must
depend on the selling professional’s age, would additionally depend on the client’s age, making the
model much more cumbersome. We believe that our main insights, regarding the role of practices
as costly signals, would carry through regardless.
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fessional and client make a transaction, they learn one another’s types. They may,
on the basis of this acquired information, decide to transact again. A professional’s
age — i.e. young, old, or retiring — is publicly observable.
The matching mechanism is designed (i) to give professionals who are beginning
their second period of work and the clients they served previously an opportunity
to renegotiate their business relationship; and (ii) to give all agents access to a
Walrasian market for professional services. For this reason each period is composed
of a negotiation phase and a market phase.
First the negotiation phase. As soon as a professional becomes old, i.e. at the
beginning of his second period, he negotiates with the client he served when young.
Note that at this point the two know each other’s types. The professional makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the client. The offer is a price for his services in the
current period. If the client accepts, the transaction takes place at the offered price,
and the two agents are considered matched for the rest of that period, i.e. they do
not participate in the upcoming market phase. In that case, we say that the match
has been renewed. If the client rejects the offer, the match is dissolved: the two part
ways and will seek new matches in the market phase, still within the same period.
The negotiation phase is immediately followed by a market phase. This is a
centralized market for professional services, and involves all unmatched agents. This
means (i) all agents whose matches were dissolved during the negotiation phase, and
(ii) all those who did not participate in the negotiation phase. The latter group is
composed of young professionals (who have just entered the economy) and clients
who in the preceding period were served by old professionals (now retired). Market-
clearing prices for services are established as if by an auctioneer. Professionals’ ages
are observable, so there will be two prices in this phase: one for the services of young
professionals, which we denote pY , and one for those of old professionals, which we
denote pO. In either case, the price is for one period of service.
Per-period utilities are as follows. A professional, whatever his type, has no
costs: his utility is simply the price he receives for his unit of service. A type-i
client who pays p for a unit of service gets utility θiH−p if the professional she deals
with is high-quality, and θL − p if low-quality, where
0 < θL < θBH < θAH . (1)
Anyone who does not transact gets zero utility for that period.3 All agents maximize
lifetime discounted utility.
An equilibrium consists of:
• a market-clearing price for young professionals on the market, pY ;
• a market-clearing price for old professionals on the market, pO;
3It may be natural to interpret all this as saying that type-A clients are wealthier than type-B
ones. But other interpretations are possible, such as saying that some clients are more prone to
illness or legal troubles than others.
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• for each possible client-professional pairing (A-H, A-L, B-H and B-L), an optimal
price to be offered by the professional when the partnership is up for renewal
(i.e. during the negotiation phase), and an optimal acceptance-rejection rule to
be implemented by the client.
These values and rules must be the same from period to period.
2.2 Efficiency
Since type-A clients value high-quality service more than type-B ones do (relative to
low-quality service and no service), social efficiency can be measured by the number
of A-H matches. There are at all times a measure ψA of type-A clients in the
economy, as well as a measure 2q of type-H professionals (q young ones and q old
ones). A socially optimal outcome, then, is one where the measure of A-H matches
in each period is equal to min{ψA, 2q}, meaning that either all type-A clients are
matched with type-H professionals or vice versa.
2.3 Equilibrium
Let Vi be the value to a type-i client of being on the market, i.e. without a match.
And let Vij be the value to a type-i client of being in the negotiation phase with a
type-j professional.
Let us look at the negotiation phase first. Consider a client-professional relation-
ship which is up for renewal. By this time the client and professional have learned
each other’s types. The professional makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, consisting of
a price p for his services for one period. Suppose, to illustrate, that the client’s
type is A and the professional’s is H. If the client accepts the offer, her payoff this
period is θAH − p, and she returns to the market next period (when the professional
retires), which makes her total discounted payoff θAH − p + δVA. If she rejects the
offer, she goes on the market this period and gets VA. The highest price she will
consider (let us call it p¯AH) is that which makes these two values equal, that is to
say p¯AH = θAH − (1− δ)VA. The threshold prices for all possible matches are
p¯AH = θAH − (1− δ)VA ; (2)
p¯BH = θBH − (1− δ)VB ; (3)
p¯AL = θL − (1− δ)VA ; (4)
p¯BL = θL − (1− δ)VB . (5)
(6)
In equilibrium the client will accept any offer p ≤ p¯ij and reject any offer p > p¯ij.
From the professional’s perspective, the situation is quite simple. If his offer of
p is accepted, he gets that price; if it is rejected, he goes on the market this period
and gets pO, the market price for old professionals’ services. And no matter what
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happens this period, he will retire next period. Clearly the best thing for him to do
if p¯ij > pO is to offer the price p¯ij, which is accepted. If p¯ij < pO, on the other hand,
then no agreement is possible: the professional makes an unacceptable offer and
both he and the client end up on the market. If p¯ij = pO he is indifferent between
the two outcomes.
We see that the client will never be offered a price below the maximum she is
willing to pay. In equilibrium there are two outcomes for her: either she will accept
an offer of p¯ij, which will leave her no better and no worse off than being on the
market; or she will reject an offer of p > p¯ij, and actually end up on the market. So
both outcomes must have the same value:
Vij = Vi . (7)
Now let us consider the market phase. On the market, a client can purchase the
services of a young professional at price pY , those of an old professional at price pO,
or she can purchase nothing. If she hires a young professional, she has a probability
q of getting high-quality service. Let qO denote the probability of receiving high-
quality service when hiring an old professional: this is the proportion of high-quality
professionals among all old professionals on the market, and it is endogenous. Thus
a client gets expected utility qθiH +(1− q)θL−pY for this period if she hires a young
professional, and qOθiH + (1 − qO)θL − pO if she hires an old one; she gets 0 if she
hires no one. In all three cases she expects δVi from next period onward, whether
on the market or in negotiations, since Vij = Vi, as we have shown. Thus the client’s
prospects can be written as
Vi = max{q θiH + (1− q) θL − pY + δVi,
qO θiH + (1− qO) θL − pO + δVi, δVi} , (8)
or more usefully
(1− δ)Vi = max{q θiH + (1− q) θL − pY ,
qO θiH + (1− qO) θL − pO , 0} . (9)
We may now begin to characterize equilibrium. All proofs appear in the ap-
pendix.
Lemma 1. All A-H and B-H matches up for renewal are renewed. Hence qO = 0.
This establishes that old professionals on the market will not be sought after.
The logic is simply that if they were high-quality they would be serving their old
clients, not looking for new ones. The following result is what we call a crowding-out
equilibrium.
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Theorem 1. If ψA ≥ 1 + q, then in equilibrium all young professionals are hired
by A-clients. Equilibrium is efficient.
When ψA ≥ 1 + q, A-clients are so numerous that they bid the price of young
professionals up to pY = qθAH +(1− q)θL, which is too high for B-clients. All young
professionals are hired by A-clients, and all A-H matches are renewed. This means
that all H-pros are always matched with A-clients, and efficiency is achieved. But
it is achieved because A-clients are numerous enough to crowd out B-clients in the
market for young professionals. Introducing practices into the economy will not
change this result.
Throughout the rest of the paper we will assume that ψA < 1 + q. This is the
more challenging case, as something rather more complex (involving practices) will
be required to obtain a socially efficient outcome.
Lemma 2. Some B-clients hire young pros.
The last result implies that
(1− δ)VB = qθBH + (1− q)θL − pY . (10)
To pin down the prices pY and pO, it is necessary to invoke the assumption that
clients outnumber professionals. The main implication of this assumption is of
course that some clients must do without professional services, and thus get zero
utility. Either VA or VB must be zero. But looking at (9) we see that VA = 0 implies
VB = 0. Sot VB must be zero in any case. We can then use (10) to find
pY = qθBH + (1− q)θL . (11)
There remains to find the market-clearing price for old pros’ services. Formally we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium pO = θL.
We can then compute the threshold prices which characterize all negotiations:
p¯AH = qθBH + (1− q)θAH ; (12)
p¯AL = θL − q(θAH − θBH) ; (13)
p¯BH = θBH ; (14)
p¯BL = θL . (15)
We see that p¯AL < pO, which means that all A-L matches will be dissolved. As
for B-L matches, they can be renewed or dissolved, since L-pros negotiating with
B-clients are indifferent between renewing at p¯BL = θL or going on the market to
earn pO = θL.
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At these prices, A-clients will strictly prefer hiring young pros whenever they are
on the market (i.e. when they are not renewing their matches). B-clients, on the
other hand, will be indifferent among all three options: hiring young pros, hiring old
pros, and hiring no one. And indeed each option must be chosen by some B-clients
if markets are to clear.
These results give us a full picture of professional-client interactions in the econ-
omy. They are illustrated in Figure 1. In this figure, time is measured horizontally.
Two generations of professionals are shown: one of them is young at time t− 1 and
old at t; the other is young at t and old at t+1. Each horizontal stratum represents
a possible history for a professional. First he goes on the market when young, and
is matched with either a type-A or type-B client. An arrow indicates that his match
is then renewed. If there is no arrow, it means that his match is dissolved; he goes
on the market and gets a new client.
The column labelled t gives us an idea of the composition of the economy in
steady state, since it comprises two cohorts, one young and one old. Naturally, all
clients who obtain services should also be accounted for in this column.
As the figure shows, all A-H and B-H matches are renewed. An L-pro, if he is
initially matched with an A-client, will see this match dissolved; in the following
period he will go on the market and be hired by a B-client, since only B-clients hire
old pros. If the L-pro is initially matched with a B-client, then during negotiations
he will be indifferent between renewing at price p¯BL or going on the market and
earning pO, since the two quantities are equal (in the diagram the match is shown
to be renewed).
b
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b
a
b
b
b
a
H
L
γ q
(1−γ) q
γ (1−q)
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-
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a
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b
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t− 1 t t+ 1
Figure 1. Professionals’ histories in equilibrium. The
letters a and b mean being matched with that type of
client. Arrows indicate matches renewed during the
negotiation phase.
To the right of each stratum is written the number of pros from each cohort who
go through that particular history. The symbol γ denotes the measure of A-clients
who hire young professionals in a given period. Since all A-H matches are renewed,
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there must also be in any given period a measure γq of A-clients served by old
H-pros, with whom they have renewed their relationship from the previous period.
Since A-L matches are not renewed and type-A clients do not hire old professionals,
this accounts for all type-A clients. So the entire population of A-clients, which is
ψA, must be equal to those who hire young pros (a measure γ) plus those who have
renewed with H-pros (a measure γq). Hence γ + γq = ψA, or equivalently
γ =
ψA
1 + q
. (16)
The total number of A-H matches in a given period t, including those just formed
and those renewed, is 2γq. This number is less than ψA, the population of A-clients,
and also less than 2q, the population of working H-pros. So the number of such
matches is less than what it could be. As a result, we have
Theorem 2. When ψA < 1 + q, an equilibrium without trade in practices is not
socially efficient.
This inefficiency arises from the fact that A-L and B-H matches are formed on
the market. This is inevitable, since both types of clients hire young pros on the
market, and these young pros have no way of revealing their types. It is now time
to see whether a market for practices can provide such a way.
3 The Model With Practices
We now add a market for practices. Practices in our model are essentially options
to negotiate with particular clients. The market for practices is therefore distinct
from the market for services. Services are provided by professionals and purchased
by clients, whereas practices are traded among professionals only. Professionals who
have just reached retirement age play a role in this section, so it is useful to keep in
mind that there are three ages for professionals: young, old, and retiring. When we
say working professional, we will mean one who is young or old.
Each period now has three phases: a practice phase, a negotiation phase, and a
market phase, in that order.
The period opens with a practice phase. This is a centralized market for prac-
tices. At this point a professional who served a client in the previous period (i.e.
an old or retiring pro) may sell the right to negotiate with this client. This is called
selling a practice. Any professional of working age (i.e. young or old) may buy a
practice. When a practice is sold, the buyer becomes matched with the client, and
the seller becomes unmatched. It is the buyer, then, who moves on to the negotia-
tion phase with the client. We emphasize that we use the term practice only in this
narrow sense of a clientele that is sold from one professional to another. Matches
formed during the market phase are not called practices.
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Note that if an old professional wants to buy a practice, he must first break off
his previous match. This can be done by simply abandoning his client (who will
seek a new match during the market phase), or by selling his old practice. In the
latter case, the professional is simultaneously a buyer and seller of practices.
For simplicity we will assume that only matches with A-clients are sold as prac-
tices. Including B-practices in our model, while possible, is not informative enough
to warrant the added complications.4
Obviously, a pro who buys a practice will want proof that the client he is ac-
quiring is indeed an A-client. We assume that sellers can provide such proof. We
know that a pro who has served a client for one period has learned the client’s type.
We are assuming that he can pass on this information to another professional in a
verifiable manner. Later we will consider other possible assumptions regarding the
revelation of client types.
When a practice is sold, the client is aware of the transaction (she sees that she
is matched with someone new) but does not participate in it. However, she will have
the choice whether to accept this new match or take her business elsewhere in the
ensuing negotiation phase.
Once the practice phase is over, retiring professionals formally retire and have
no further role in the economy.
The negotiation phase comes next. As before, all professionals who are matched
with clients make take-it-or-leave-it offers to those clients. This time the profes-
sionals involved are: (i) all those (young or old) who have just bought practices,
and (ii) all old professionals who have not sold practices. When a client accepts,
the transaction proceeds at the proposed price and the two parties are considered
matched for the remainder of the period. When she refuses, both parties go on the
market.
The one difference between negotiations here and negotiations in the previous
section is that here information is not always perfect. If the professional has just
acquired the practice, he and the client have not had an opportunity to learn each
other’s types. Beliefs, described below, will come into play.
Then comes the market phase. As before, it is a centralized market for profes-
sional services, in which all unmatched agents participate.
Figure 2 summarizes the timing.
3.1 Beliefs and practice prices
In the benchmark model, the negotiation phase necessarily involved agents who
knew each other’s types. Here this is not always the case. If a professional has just
bought a practice, then he and the client have just met. We have assumed that the
4The value of a B-practice lies not in the nature of the client herself, but in the opportunity for
a professional to reveal his type to that client. Some results and examples involving B-practices are
available from the authors.
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Figure 2. Timing.
professional learns the client’s type from the seller of the practice. But the client
must form a belief as to the professional’s type, based on the information at hand.
Let us say that she ascribes a probability µ to the professional being type-H and
1 − µ to his being type-L. She forms this belief based on what she knows or can
observe: the age and type of the seller (previous owner) and the age of the buyer
(new owner). The age of the new owner is clearly relevant, since this may tell her
something about his type, which she cares about. But what about the characteristics
of the previous owner, someone with whom she will have no more dealings?
The seller’s age is relevant because it is also observed by the buyer, and so it
can act as a coordination device between the client and the buyer. For example, we
could imagine an equilibrium in which only young H-pros buy practices from retiring
sellers, but equal numbers of young H-pros and young L-pros buy them from old
sellers. Client beliefs must reflect this reality: when the practice is sold by a retiree
to a young pro, the client should be certain that the new owner is an H-pro; but in
the case of an old seller and a young buyer, she should think it equally likely that
the new owner is one type or the other.
The previous owner’s type, since it is not observable by the new owner, cannot
be such a coordination device. It will therefore not figure in the formation of beliefs.
There are, then, four beliefs to specify: µY O when the practice is bought by a
young professional from an old one, µY R when it is bought by a young pro from a
retiring one, µOO when both buyer and seller are old, and µOR when the buyer is
old and the seller is retiring. Beliefs are common knowledge in equilibrium.
These beliefs in turn affect how much a client is willing to pay for the services
offered by the practice’s new owner. In this way they affect the value of a practice.
It follows that practices supplied by old and retiring professional are different things.
As such they can sell for different prices. Let us denote by kO the price of a practice
sold by an old pro, and by kR the price of a practice sold by a retiring one.
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3.2 Negotiation strategies
As before, the client’s strategy during negotiations is to have a threshold price: she
accepts any price equal to or less than this threshold and rejects any price above it.
This threshold is based on her knowledge of (or belief about) the professional’s type
and on her reservation payoff.
Let Vi be the value to a type-i client of being on the open market, just as in
Section 2. This is her reservation payoff, since the open market is where she goes if
she rejects an offer. The value to her of being in negotiations with any professional
must be equal to Vi in equilibrium. The reasoning is basically the same as before.
During negotiations, the professional knows (or is sure of) his client’s type. He
knows, then, the client’s threshold price. His optimal strategy is to offer this price
(if he wants the offer to be accepted) or a higher one (if he wants the offer to be
rejected). In either case, the client gets a payoff equal to Vi.
When the professional and client know each other from before, the maximum
price the client is willing to accept is found in the same way as in Section 2. We
again call this price p¯ij, where i is the client’s type and j the professional’s. The
four possibilities are given by equations (2) through (5).
When the professional and client do not know each other from before, i.e. when
the professional has just bought the practice, then the threshold price depends on
µ, the client’s belief that the professional is type-H. If the client accepts an offer of
p, her expected payoff for this period is µθAH + (1− µ)θL − p. Her payoff from the
next period onward is VA (whether on the market or via negotiations), making the
total µθAH +(1−µ)θL−p+ δVA. If she rejects the offer, she goes on the market this
period and gets VA. The highest price she will consider is that which makes these
two values equal:
p¯A(µ) = µθAH + (1− µ)θL − (1− δ)VA . (17)
As explained previously, the value of µ depends on the ages of the two professionals
involved in the sale of the practice. Note that p¯A(1) = p¯AH and p¯A(0) = p¯AL.
As in Section 2, the professional has to decide whether to offer the threshold
price, which the client will accept, or a higher one, which the client will reject. But
here he may have a few more things to consider, such as the revenue from selling
the practice in a later period. Also, the professional may be young, in which case a
renewed match can mean more negotiations next period. The various possibilities
will be explored shortly.
3.3 Market values
When young professionals buy practices, this affects the proportion of type-H pros
among young pros left on the market. We can no longer count on this proportion
being q as in the benchmark model; it is now endogenous and we will call it qY .
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For old professionals, we define qO as before. Clients on the market face the same
choices (hire a young pro, hire an old pro, hire no one), yielding this time
(1− δ)Vi = max{qY θiH + (1− qY ) θL − pY ,
qO θiH + (1− qO) θL − pO , 0} . (18)
3.4 Professional strategies
There are various life histories possible for a professional. We must account for the
buying and selling of practices, the renewal or dissolution of matches and possibly
the uncertainty as to which type of client he is matched with on the market.
There is one thing we can rule out: the dissolution of a match involving the new
owner of a practice. When a pro buys a practice, he is certain that the client is
type-A, and so he knows what price he must offer her to keep her as a client. If this
price does not suit him, then it was a waste of money to buy the practice in the first
place. We may be assured, then, that new practice owners will serve their clients
for at least one period.
Let us consider the ways that an old pro can get a new client. He can buy a
practice from a retiring pro: this will cost him kR and allow him to charge p¯A(µOR)
this period, then he can sell the practice for kR next period. He can buy a practice
from an old pro instead. Or he can buy no practice at all, dissolve his match during
the negotiation phase, and go on the market, where he will get pO. We define VO as
the highest of the three payoffs:
VO = max{−kR + p¯A(µOR) + δkR , −kO + p¯A(µOO) + δkR , pO} . (19)
Note that we do not distinguish between H-pros and L-pros in this case, because
this value is necessarily the same for both. An old pro is set to retire the following
period. So by the time the client finds out the pro’s type, it will be too late for her
to do anything about it.
Now we turn to the case of a young H-pro who has just entered the economy. If
he buys a practice from a retiring pro and keeps it until he retires, he will get
V RH = −kR + p¯A(µY R) + δmax{ p¯AH + δkR , kO + VO } . (20)
He buys the practice for an amount kR. His client has belief µY R, so during the
first period he obtains p¯A(µY R) for his services. By the second period, however, his
type is known. He can renew his match at price p¯AH and sell the practice when he
retires. Or he can sell the practice now and find a new client (in one of the three
ways listed above).
The same scenarios are possible with a practice bought from an old (rather than
a retiring) professional. The payoff in that case is
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V O
H
= −kO + p¯A(µY O) + δmax{ p¯AH + δkR , kO + VO } . (21)
Finally, the young H-pro might choose not to buy a practice. He will get pY for
his services when young. His full expected payoff is
V M
H
= pY + αδmax{ p¯AH + δkR , kO + VO }+ (1− α)δmax{p¯BH , VO} . (22)
Here α denotes the probability that his first client is type-A. If he is indeed matched
with an A-client, then he will be able to sell that match as a practice. Thus a new
practice will have been created. This obviously has steady-state implications, which
will be discussed shortly.
Now we turn to young L-pros. If a young L-pro buys a practice from a retiring
pro, he gets p¯A(µY R) in the first period, just as an H-pro would. In the following
period, however, the client will know his type. So he can only renew the match at
price p¯AL. His payoff, therefore, is
V RL = −kR + p¯A(µY R) + δmax{ p¯AL + δkR , kO + VO } . (23)
If the practice had been bought from an old pro instead, the payoff would be
V O
L
= −kO + p¯A(µY O) + δmax{ p¯AH + δkR , kO + VO } . (24)
And if he does not buy a practice when young his career payoff is
V M
L
= pY + αδmax{ p¯AL + δkR , kO + VO }+ (1− α)δmax{p¯BL, VO} . (25)
Professionals must choose among these strategies. They do so taking practice
prices (kR and kO) and market prices (pY and pO) as given, and correctly antici-
pating clients’ beliefs and threshold prices. It is professionals’ choices among these
strategies that determine qY and qO. An equilibrium is a situation where all these
choices are optimal and consistent with clients’ beliefs.
3.5 Pooling equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium is one in which practices are not traded. Clients ascribe a
low probability µ to new owners being type-H (whatever the ages of the buyers and
sellers). Therefore whoever buys a practice cannot hope to get a higher price from
his client than what he could get on the market. As a result, practices are worthless
and no one buys them.
All other prices, proportions, payoffs and behaviour are exactly as in the bench-
mark model. And so, like the equilibrium without practices, the pooling equilibrium
is inefficient.
A pooling equilibrium always exists.
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3.6 Efficient equilibrium
Our main line of inquiry, however, is whether efficiency can be obtained when there
is a market for practices. For this reason we will now focus on cases where practices
have positive value. Because practices have positive value, everyone who is matched
with an A-client will wish to sell this match as a practice. A steady-state equilibrium
can only be achieved if all A-clients are in practices, and none of them can be found
on the market. Thus we will necessarily have α = 0 in equations (22) and (25).
Our first main result is that a market for practices does indeed provide a mech-
anism for achieving efficiency.
Theorem 3. An efficient equilibrium always exists.
The proof is in the appendix. Much depends on whether or not A-clients outnumber
H-pros. When ψA ≤ 2q, it is possible to have an equilibrium in which only H-pros
buy and sell practices. We call this a separating equilibrium.
When ψA > 2q, however, this is no longer possible: even if all H-pros buy
practices, there are still some A-clients left over, and these are traded as practices
by L-pros. An equilibrium of this kind can nevertheless be efficient: if all H-pros
have practices, the number of A-H matches is maximized. We refer to an equilibrium
in which both types of pros buy practices as a semi-pooling equilibrium.
Even when both types of professionals buy practices, there is a difference in their
behaviour. H-pros, because they can renew their matches at a high price (p¯AH), are
more likely to keep their practices for two periods. L-pros, because they can only
renew their matches at a low price (p¯AL), have a greater incentive to get rid of them
after a single period. It is this difference which we will exploit when discussing sales
taxes on practices in Section 4.3.
We offer two numerical examples, both based on the proof of Theorem 3. In the
first, H-pros outnumber A-clients; in the second, we have the reverse.
Example 1. Let parameter values be θL = 1, θBH = 2, θAH = 3, q = 0.5,
ψA = 0.8, ψB = 2, and δ = 2/3. Then the following is an equilibrium,
illustrated by Figure 3. Market prices are pY = 7/6 and pO = 1. Market
proportions are qY = 1/6 and qO = α = 0. Threshold prices are p¯AH = 17/6,
p¯BH = 2, p¯AL = 5/6, and p¯BL = 1. Market values are VA = 0.5 and VB = 0.
Beliefs are µY R = 1 and µY O = µOR = µOO = 0. Practice prices are kR = 4
and kO = 3. Lifetime utility is V
R2
H
= 47/18 for type-H pros and V M
L
= 11/6
for type-L pros. Since pO = p¯BL, B-L matches may be renewed or not.
Example 2. Let parameter values be θL = 1, θBH = 2, θAH = 3, q =
0.4, ψA = 1, ψB = 2, and δ = 0.5. Then the following is an equilibrium,
illustrated by Figure 4. Market prices are pY = pO = 1. Market proportions
are qY = qO = α = 0. Threshold prices are p¯AH = 3, p¯BH = 2, and
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Figure 3. Professionals’ histories in Example 1.
p¯AL = p¯BL = 1. Market values are VA = VB = 0. Each period a measure
0.32 of young H-pros buy practices from retiring pros; and another 0.08 buy
them from old pros. Also, a measure 0.08 of young L-pros buy practices
from retiring pros, and another 0.12 buy them from old pros. H-pros keep
their practices for two periods; L-pros keep theirs for only one. Beliefs are
µY R = 0.8, µY O = 0.4 and µOR = µOO = 0. Practice prices are kR = 2.4 and
kO = 1.6. Lifetime utility is V
R
H
= 2.3 for type-H pros and V M
L
= 1.5 for
type-L pros. Since pO = p¯BL, B-L matches may be renewed or not.
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Figure 4. Professionals’ histories in Example 2.
4 Robustness
In this part of the paper we want to add a realistic shock to the model, and see
which, if any, of the model’s efficient equilibria are robust to it. We also want to
see if a taxation scheme on the part of the government can remedy any lack of
robustness we might find.
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The shock is simple: each period a positive fraction ǫ of all old professionals
must leave the economy. Those who have to leave are informed of this before the
practice phase, but their departure takes place immediately after the practice phase.
This gives them a chance to sell their practices, if they have any, before they leave.
Agents who leave in this way are not replaced. The remaining fraction 1− ǫ are said
to “survive the shock,” i.e. they remain in the economy until they retire.
The relevance is easy to see. In the real world, people sometimes have to relo-
cate. Or maybe they need money right away and cannot borrow. The fact that a
professional sells his practice before the end of his career is not necessarily due to his
quality. Granted, we could have modelled relocation as a choice. But if conditions
(prices, etc.) are the same across locations, it is hard to see why an old H-pro would
choose to relocate and give up the trust he has built up with his clientele. So we
prefer to think of relocation as something beyond the agent’s control, i.e. a shock.
When he enters the economy, a young pro knows there is a probability ǫ that he
will have to leave a period later. He needs to factor that into his expected payoffs
(V R2
H
and so on). If he buys a practice, and then it turns out that he is chosen to
leave, then obviously he will sell that practice before leaving, as long as kO > 0.
All pros are equally likely to be forced to leave: H-pros, L-pros, those who bought
practices, those who did not, those who are matched with A-clients, those who are
matched with B-clients. With the addition of this shock, Equations (22) to (24)
become
V RH = −kR + p¯A(µY R) + δǫkO
+δ(1 − ǫ)max{ p¯AH + δkR , kO + VO } ; (26)
V O
H
= −kO + p¯A(µY O) + δǫkO
+δ(1 − ǫ)max{ p¯AH + δkR , kO + VO } ; (27)
V M
H
= pY + δ(1 − ǫ)max{p¯BH , VO} ; (28)
V R
L
= −kR + p¯A(µY R) + δǫkO
+δ(1 − ǫ)max{ p¯AL + δkR , kO + VO } ; (29)
V OL = −kO + p¯A(µY O) + δǫkO
+δ(1 − ǫ)max{ p¯AL + δkR , kO + VO } ; (30)
V ML = pY + δ(1 − ǫ)max{p¯BL, VO} . (31)
We have in mind a small value for ǫ. In fact, we are interested in results that
hold true as ǫ tends to zero. So the ǫ-shock will not have an appreciable impact
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on the expected payoffs themselves. Its major impact will come from the fact that
now there will necessarily be old pros selling their practices, even when ψA ≤ 2q.
The separating equilibria discussed in Section 3.6, in which only retiring H-pros sold
practices, may no longer exist. This will explained in detail in Section 4.1 below.
We consider an equilibrium to be much more realistic if it is robust to this shock
than if it is not. We proceed now to find conditions under which an equilibrium
which is both efficient and robust exists.
4.1 Non-robustness of efficient separating equilibria
The separating equilibria described in the first part of the proof of Theorem 3 (which
require ψA ≤ 2q) are vulnerable to the shock we just discussed. In those equilibria
only retiring pros sold practices. Because µY O = µOO = 0, anyone who bought a
practice from an old pro would be presumed low-quality. If we add the ǫ-shock to
these equilibria, we create a situation where some of the pros who bought practices
when young sell them at price kO when old. For markets to clear, other pros have
to buy these practices from them: buying a practice from an old pro now has to be
optimal. This is only possible if either µYO or µOO is sufficiently high. With this
change of beliefs, some of the incentives which made the equilibrium work no longer
hold. So these particular equilibria are not robust. The following theorem and its
proof work out the details thoroughly.
Theorem 4. If ψA ≤ 2q, equilibrium cannot be both efficient and robust.
This is significant. Theorem 3, showing the existence of an efficient separating
equilibrium, gave us reason to believe that the market for practices could serve as
a strong signalling device, perfectly separating H-pros from L-pros. But such an
equilibrium is not robust to the small, realistic shock to which we subjected it.
Semi-pooling equilibria can also be efficient, as shown in the second part of the
proof of Theorem 3. We must determine if they can also be robust.
4.2 Robustness of efficient semi-pooling equilibria
Intuitively, semi-pooling equilibria such as that in Example 2 have better chances
of being robust. They involve the purchase of practices by young L-pros, who sell
them after a single period. Someone, then, does buy practices from old pros. The
belief µY O refers to purchase scenarios that actually take place in equilibrium; it
is not an off-equilibrium belief. Therefore the ǫ-shock should not affect things too
much. This intuition is correct, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 5. If ψA > 2q, a robust, efficient equilibrium exists.
The caveat that A-clients must outnumber H-pros (ψA > 2q) is a holdover from
Theorem 3. Semi-pooling equilibria do exist when ψA ≤ 2q, and they are robust.
They are just not efficient.
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In the next section, we show that an efficient, robust separating equilibrium can
always be induced through taxation. In equilibrium the tax is only levied against
people leaving the economy, hence does not raise much revenue. Its purpose is of
course to provide the incentives which lead to efficiency and robustness.
4.3 Taxation
We will now consider a tax on the sale of practices as a possible way of ensuring
efficiency and robustness when the practice market alone fails to do so, i.e. when
ψA ≤ 2q. A tax effectively drives a wedge between the price paid by the buyer and
that received by the seller, and can thus give us more leeway in our effort to satisfy
incentive constraints.
Essentially we wish to make the purchase of practices less attractive to L-pros
without making them less attractive to H-pros. We know that, on the whole, H-
pros have no trouble holding their practices for two periods, whereas L-pros, if they
do buy practices, are likely to sell them quickly. Types are unobservable, even to
the government. But a professional’s age is fully observable. Levying a tax on
the sale of a practice, contingent on the seller’s age, might be the answer to the
efficiency/robustness problem.
We imagine a proportional tax τ on the sale of practices, to be paid by the
seller. Retiring pros are exempt from this tax. Therefore only old pros selling their
practices must pay it. The idea is that if the tax is set at a suitable level, only
agents who are compelled to do so by the ǫ-shock will sell their practices when old.
This may make it possible for all the other equilibrium, efficiency and robustness
conditions to be satisfied.
With the tax in place, V MH and V
M
L are still given by (28) and (31), but the other
payoffs are now
V R
H
= −kR + p¯A(µY R) + δǫkO(1− τ)
+δ(1 − ǫ)max{ p¯AH + δkR , kO(1− τ) + VO } ; (32)
V OH = −kO + p¯A(µY O) + δǫkO(1− τ)
+δ(1 − ǫ)max{ p¯AH + δkR , kO(1− τ) + VO } ; (33)
V R
L
= −kR + p¯A(µY R) + δǫkO(1− τ)
+δ(1 − ǫ)max{ p¯AL + δkR , kO(1− τ) + VO } ; (34)
V OL = −kO + p¯A(µY O) + δǫkO(1− τ)
+δ(1 − ǫ)max{ p¯AL + δkR , kO(1− τ) + VO } . (35)
The taxation instrument does achieve the goal, as the next theorem will show.
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Theorem 6. Suppose that ψA ≤ 2q. If the tax τ satisfies
τ ≥
[
(1− δ)(θBH − θL)
(θAH − θL) + δ(θAH − θBH)
]
, (36)
then there exists an efficient, robust separating equilibrium.
5 Discussion
This section discusses various possible extensions alluded to earlier in the paper.
5.1 Revelation of client types
At the beginning of Section 3 we assumed that the seller of a practice can prove his
client’s type to prospective buyers. The main consequence of this is that anyone
with an A-client can sell this match as a practice. In any steady-state equilibrium in
which practices have value, new practices will not be created, since old ones will net
be discarded. Thus matches with A-clients cannot be formed on the market. But
other assumptions are possible with regards to the transfer of information about a
client’s type.
At one extreme, suppose client types were perfectly observable. Then profes-
sionals would seek out A-clients on the market, applying price discrimination. The
role of practices would be lessened, but not eliminated. High-quality professionals
would still have an incentive to buy practices, as a way of signalling their type. The
assumption does not seem quite reasonable: a client’s willingness-to-pay or level of
need is seldom an outwardly apparent characteristic.
At the other extreme, if sellers of practices had no way of revealing their clients’
types, then buyers would have no way of obtaining this information. All pros,
including those with B-clients, could claim that they were matched with A-clients
and try to sell their match as an A-practice. Buyers would be in the dark as to
whether the client was truly type-A or not. A-practices and B-practices would be
sold for the same price, or not at all.
A more reasonable assumption would be the following. When a professional offers
his practice for sale, he makes known to a prospective buyer the last price paid by
the client. If that price is high enough, then the buyer will be satisfied that only
an A-client would have paid it. In actual practice markets, a professional buying
a practice may have access to “the books,” or accounting records, which include
records of past transactions between the seller of the practice and his clientele.
In our model, this would add the following requirements: when a retiring pro
sells a practice, the last price paid must be greater than what B-clients pay old pros
in equilibrium (p¯BH , p¯BL or pO); similarly, when an old pro sells a practice, the last
price paid must be greater than what B-clients pay young pros in equilibrium (pY ).
For H-pros who buy practices when young and want to sell them when they retire,
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this is no problem: the last price they receive from their clients is p¯AH . But L-pros
cannot hold practices for two periods; and depending on µOO and µOR, old pros may
not be able to buy practices and sell them for kR a period later. Being with an
A-client no longer guarantees one has a practice to sell.
These added restrictions would make the separation of H-pros and L-pros easier
to achieve. There would in fact be efficient separating equilibria for ψA > 2q. In
these equilibria, not all clients are in practices: some of them hire pros during the
market phase, and hence α can be positive.5 However, they would not be robust to
the ǫ-shock. The equilibria in our current model would continue to be equilibria with
this new assumption, and they would still have the same efficiency and robustness
properties. All our theorems would continue to hold.
5.2 Clients on the short side
We have assumed throughout that ψA +ψB > 2, i.e. that clients outnumber profes-
sionals. Here we consider some implications of assuming that ψA+ψB < 2, i.e. that
it was professionals who outnumbered clients. We nonetheless assume ψA+ψB > 2q,
to prevent H-pros from servicing the entire population.
Because professionals outnumber clients, competition forces some of them to
offer their services for free. Moreover, some professionals must remain unemployed,
at least for one period. Indeed there is no guarantee that a professional who works
will do so for two periods. In Example 3, which follows, some pros work when young
and old, others work only when young, and the rest do not work at all. Specifically,
each period a measure 0.2 of young H-pros buy practices and the remaining young
H-pros go on the market (where there are only B-clients). All H-pros’ matches are
renewed, hence they work for two periods. A measure 0.2 of young L-pros go on
the market, see their matches dissolved, and do not return to the market — “no”
means they do not offer their services. Finally, a measure 0.4 of L-pros do not work
in either period.
Example 3. Let parameter values be θL = 1, θBH = 2, θAH = 3, q = 0.4, ψA = 0.4,
ψB = 0.6, and δ = 2/3. Then the following is an equilibrium, illustrated by Figure 5.
Market prices are pY = 0 and pO = 0. Market proportions are qY = 0.5 and qO = 0.
Threshold prices are p¯AH = 1, p¯BH = 0.5, p¯AL = −1 and p¯BL = −0.5. Market values
are VA = 6 and VB = 4.5. Beliefs are µY R = 1 and µY O = µOR = µOO = 0. Practice
prices are kR = 2.4. Lifetime utility is 1/3 for type-H pros and 0 for type-L pros.
Very little else changes, however. All of the theorems in the paper continue to
hold. The equilibria constructed in the proofs of those theorems continue to be
equilibria, if we set pY = pO = 0 and adjust the threshold prices (p¯AH and so on)
accordingly. Therefore the main results do not depend on who is on the short side
of the market.
5Examples are available upon request.
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Figure 5. Professionals’ histories in Example 3. Here “no”
means the professional does not supply his services and is un-
employed.
5.3 B-practices
Throughout the paper we have assumed that a practice is a match with an A-client.
This was made for convenience, to keep things as simple as possible. The model can
certainly accommodate trade in B-practices as well. Because a professional selling
a practice is able to reveal (verifiably) his client’s type to prospective buyers, A-
practices and B-practices would be distinct commodities on the market — and of
course one would be still have to be make the distinction between practices sold by
retiring pros and those sold by old ones, making four different prices for practices.
The following shows an example. Here we call kBO the price of a B-practice sold
by an old professional, and kBR the price of one sold by a retiring one.
Example 4. Let parameter values be θL = 1, θBH = 2, θAH = 3, q = 0.3, ψA = 0.4,
ψB = 2, and δ = 2/3. Then the following is an equilibrium, illustrated by Figure
6. Market prices are pY = pO = 1. Market proportions are qY = qO = α = 0.
Threshold prices are p¯AH = 3, p¯BH = 2, and p¯AL = p¯BL = 1. Market values are
VA = VB = 0. Beliefs are µY R = 1 and µY O = µOR = µOO = 0 (for both types of
practices). Practice prices are kR = 4, kO = 2.5, kBR = 1 and kBO = 0. Lifetime
utility is 25/9 for type-H pros and 5/3 for type-L pros.
One may ask why a professional would buy a B-practice, since it means acquiring
a relatively low-paying client. The reason is that it gives the professional a way to
signal his type. This is apparent in the example. H-pros who buy B-practices are
able to charge their clients p¯BH = 2. L-pros, who are also servicing B-clients, can
only charge them pY = pO = 1.
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Figure 6. Professionals’ histories in Example 4.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a model in which professionals provide services to
clients as well as buy and sell practices from each other. We began by laying out a
mathematical structure which allows the study of these concurrent markets. This
structure is characterized by (i) complete endogeneity of prices for both services and
practices; (ii) very little knowledge by agents regarding other agents’ types; (iii) the
absence of any exogenous frictions such as switching costs.
It was shown that without trade in practices, the market for services is generally
inefficient. The introduction of practices provides high-quality professionals with
the opportunity to signal their types by the purchase of a practice, and so yields
a socially efficient outcome. Our next step was the introduction of a simple shock:
each period, an exogenously determined portion of all professionals in mid-career
are forced to leave the economy, but are allowed to sell practices before they go
(as commonly happens to real professionals). We found that for some parameter
values, the socially efficient equilibria obtained previously were no longer tenable
when the shock was added. In these cases, however, a tax levied on mid-career sales
of practices could ensure the existence of a robust efficient equilibrium.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that matches between i-clients and j-pros are renewed
if p¯ij > pO and dissolved if p¯ij < pO. From equations (2) through (5) we can see
that p¯AL < p¯AH and p¯BL < p¯BH . This means that L-pros are at least as likely to see
their matches dissolved as H-pros are. Hence the proportion of old H-pros among
all old pros on the market cannot be higher than q. So we have, as a preliminary
result, qO ≤ q.
If any A-clients hire young pros, it means that (1−δ)VA = qθAH+(1−q)θL−pY .
Some of these will be young pros will be type-H. If any of these A-H matches are
dissolved, it means that pO ≥ p¯AH . Combining these two results with (2) leads to
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pO > pY . But with pO > pY and qO ≤ q, there will be no demand on the market for
these old pros whose matches were just dissolved [see (9)]. That would mean excess
supply, which cannot happen in equilibrium. We conclude that all A-H matches
are renewed. Following a similar reasoning, all B-H matches are renewed as well.
Therefore no H-pros end up on the market when old, and so qO = 0 in equilibrium.
6
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose ψA ≥ 1 + q. Suppose that some young pros are
hired by B-clients. This means that for an unmatched B-client, hiring a young pro
is weakly preferred to the other two options (hiring an old pro, hiring no one). If
that is the case, then it will be strictly preferred for an unmatched A-client — we
can see this by inspecting (9) and recalling from Lemma 1 that qO = 0. We can use
these facts, together with (4), to find that pO > p¯AL, so that all A-L matches will
be dissolved. A-H matches, however, will be renewed (see Lemma 1). Putting all
this together: in any period there will be A-clients hiring young pros, but that will
be a measure less than 1 since some young pros are hired by B-clients; there will
be A-clients renewing matches with H-pros, but that will be a measure less than q;
the rest will be unmatched. But unmatched A-clients only want to hire young pros:
hence we have excess demand. We conclude that B-clients will not hire young pros
if ψA ≥ 1 + q.
Further work shows that when ψA ≥ 1+q markets clear at pY = qθAH+(1−q)θL
and pO = θL. In equilibrium all young pros will be hired by A-clients. The H-pros
among these will renew their matches. Therefore all H-pros will be matched with
A-clients, and so equilibrium is efficient.
Proof of Lemma 2. If B-clients do not hire any young pros, then all young pros
must be hired by A-clients. We know from Lemma 1 that all A-H matches are
renewed. So A-clients are required to keep all young pros (a measure 1) and all old
H-pros (a measure q) employed. However, this situation has been ruled out by our
assumption that ψA < 1 + q.
Proof of Lemma 3. We cannot have pO < θL, as that would mean VB > 0, which
has already been ruled out. We know from Lemma 2 that B-clients hire young pros;
hence B-L matches will be formed. If pO > θL, we have pO > p¯BL and these matches
will be dissolved. Consequently some old pros will end up supplying their services
on the market. But with pO > θL (and the fact that qO = 0) no client will want to
hire an old pro; hence there will be excess supply.
6If there are no old pros at all on the market, then technically speaking qO is not well defined.
This situation cannot arise in the benchmark model, but is possible in the model with practices.
If this is to happen, then qO and pO must be such that old pros’ services are neither supplied nor
demanded. One can show that this is only possible with qO = 0 and pO = θL.
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Proof of Theorem 3. We first address the case where H-pros outnumber A-clients,
i.e. where ψA ≤ 2q, then consider the complementary case ψA > 2q.
Part I. Suppose ψA ≤ 2q. An equilibrium exists, described as follows. Each period
a measure ψA/2 of young H-pros buy practices; each one holds it for two periods
and sells it when he retires. No one else buys practices. This means there will be
q − (ψA/2) young H-pros on the market in each period. There will also be 1 − q
young L-pros, for a total of 1− (ψA/2) young pros. Therefore
qY =
q − ψA/2
1− ψA/2
=
2q − ψA
2− ψA
. (37)
Let market prices be pY = qY θBH + (1− qY )θL and pO = θL. Let threshold prices be
p¯AH = qY θBH+(1−qY )θAH , p¯BH = θBH , p¯AL = θL−qY (θAH−θBH) and p¯BL = θL. All
A-H and B-H matches are renewed, all A-L matches are dissolved, and B-L matches
are either renewed or dissolved. There are no old H-pros on the market, so qO = 0.
All A-clients are in practices, so α = 0.
For client beliefs, we have µY R = 1, which is consistent with the above behaviour,
and µY O = µOO = µOR = 0, which are off the equilibrium path. Let practice prices
be the following:
kR = (1− qY )
[
(θAH − θL) + δ(θAH − θBH)
1− δ2
]
; (38)
kO = δ(1 − qY )
[
(θAH − θL) + (θAH − θBH)
1− δ2
]
; (39)
We can verify that no professional would want to buy a practice when old, hence
VO = pO = θL. Also, we can check that p¯AH + δkR > kO + VO, meaning that H-pros
prefer keeping their practices for two periods rather than only one. Substituting our
results into the career-payoff equations, we can verify that
V R
H
= V M
H
> V O
H
; (40)
V M
L
> max{V R
L
, V O
L
} . (41)
These show that professionals’ behaviour is optimal as stated. Note that p¯AH > θBH ,
so a retiring pro selling a practice can prove that his client is type-A.
All equilibrium requirements are met. All A-clients are in practices owned by
H-pros, so the number of A-H matches is at its maximum, and the equilibrium is
efficient.
Part II. If ψA > 2q there exists an equilibrium, described as follows. Each period
nR
H
young H-pros and nR
L
young L-pros buy practices from retiring pros, while nO
H
young H-pros and nOL young L-pros buy them from old pros, where
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nRH = q
2
[
1 + δ − (ψA − 2q)R
δψA + (1− δ)q
]
; (42)
nRL = n
O
H = q − n
R
H ; (43)
nOL = ψA − 3q + n
R
H ; (44)
where R ≡ (θAH − θBH)/(θAH − θL). The four quantities n
R
H
, nR
L
, nO
H
and nO
L
are all
strictly between 0 and 1. Old pros never buy practices. H-pros keep their practices
for two periods, whereas L-pros only keep them for one. Note that nR
H
+ nO
H
= q
(meaning that all H-pros buy practices) and that nRL + n
O
L = ψA − 2q.
At the close of the practice phase, nRH + n
O
H young H-pros and n
R
L + n
O
L young
L-pros own practices; also, nRH+n
O
H old H-pros still own theirs, purchased the period
before. The total number of practices is therefore 2(nRH + n
O
H) + (n
R
L + n
O
L), which
is equal to ψA. That is, all A-clients are in practices. Each period the number of
buyers who buy practices from retiring pros is nR
H
+ nR
L
= q. The number of H-pros
who retire and sell theirs is nR
H
+ nO
H
= q. The number of buyers who buy practices
from old pros is nO
H
+ nO
L
= ψA − 2q. The number of old L-pros who sell theirs is
nR
L
+ nO
L
= ψA − 2q. Hence practice markets clear. For client beliefs, we have
µY R =
nR
H
q
; µY O =
q − nR
H
ψA − 2q
, (45)
which are consistent with the behaviour described above; along with µOR = µOO = 0,
which are off the equilibrium path.
All H-pros and A-clients are tied up in practices, so qY = qO = α = 0. Let
market prices be pY = pO = θL. Threshold prices are p¯AH = θAH , p¯BH = θBH , and
p¯AL = p¯BL = θL. All matches with H-pros are renewed; A-L matches are not; B-L
matches may or may not be. Let practice prices be
kR =
[
δµY O + (1− δ)µY R
1− δ
]
(θAH − θL) ; (46)
kO =
[
µY O
1− δ
]
(θAH − θL) . (47)
It is straightforward to show that old pros will not want to buy practices, that H-
pros will choose to keep practices for two periods, while L-pros who buy practices
will only want to keep them for one. Payoffs satisfy
V R
H
= V O
H
> V M
H
; (48)
V M
L
= V R
L
= V O
L
. (49)
The behaviour with which we began the proof is optimal. All equilibrium require-
ments are met. Moreover, since all H-pros own practices (and so are matched with
A-clients), this equilibrium is efficient.
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Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose ψA ≤ 2q. Suppose there is an efficient, robust
equilibrium. If a positive measure of L-pros are matched with A-clients, there will
be fewer than 2q A-clients left and some H-pros will have to be matched with B-
clients. Hence equilibrium will be inefficient. So L-pros cannot buy practices, nor
can they be hired by A-clients on the market. This has a number of implications.
first result. All young L-pros go on the market, since they do not buy practices.
Hence qY ≤ q. They must be hired by B-clients, which implies pY = qY θBH + (1 −
qY )θL, since we must have VB = 0. This yields the result pY < θBH , which we will
use towards the end of the proof.
second result. When L-pros become old (and survive the shock) they cannot
buy practices: their matches must be renewed at p¯BL or they must be hired by
B-clients on the market at pO. If pO > qOθBH + (1 − qO)θL neither of these things
can happen: matches will be dissolved because pO > p¯BL, and B-clients will not hire
old pros because doing so would give them a negative payoff. We know that pO ≥
qOθBH +(1− qO)θL, since we must have VB = 0. Therefore pO = qOθBH +(1− qO)θL.
Any positive value for qO would mean pO > p¯BL, so that all old L-pros would end
up on the market; so regardless of whether qO is positive or zero, we will certainly
have qO ≤ q. We conclude that pO < θBH , our second result.
third result. Because L-pros do not buy practices when old, we must have VO =
pO. Substituting this into (28) and (31), keeping in mind that θL ≤ pO < θBH , we
see that V M
H
> V M
L
. Because L-pros do not buy practices when young, V M
L
must be
the maximum among all three L-pro payoffs. So we have V M
H
> V R
L
and V M
H
> V O
L
.
fourth result. Suppose some young H-pros buy practices from retiring ones. This
implies V RH ≥ V
M
H , hence V
R
H > V
R
L (see third result). Looking at (26) and (29), we
see that this is only possible if p¯AH + δkR > kO + VO. This means that those who
survive the shock will renew their matches. Now suppose that some H-pros buy
practices from old pros. This implies V O
H
≥ V M
H
, hence V O
H
> V O
L
Again, this can
only happen if p¯AH + δkR > kO +VO, which means that those who survive the shock
renew their matches. And if some young pros go on the market, those who survive
the shock will also renew their matches, since p¯BH = θBH > pO = VO. We conclude
that no H-pros ever buy practices when old.
fifth result. Since someone must buy practices (otherwise we would be in a
pooling equilibrium), it must be young H-pros. In fact young H-pros must buy
practices from both old and retiring pros. If they only bought from retiring pros,
some of the buyers would be affected by the shock and wish to sell their practices
when old. But there would be no one willing to buy them. If they only bought
from old pros, then those buyers who survived the shock would renew their matches
(see fourth result) and sell their practices upon retiring. But there would be one
willing to buy them. Hence young H-pros will buy from both old and retiring
professionals. Consistency of beliefs requires therefore µY R = µYO = 1, which gives
us p¯A(µY R) = p¯A(µY O) = p¯AH . V
R
H = V
O
H is required for optimality, and since
p¯A(µY R) = p¯A(µY O) we must have kR = kO.
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sixth result. Combining the results we have so far, we can rewrite V RH and V
M
H
as follows:
V RH = −kR + p¯AH + δǫkR + δ(1− ǫ)(p¯AH + δkR) ; (50)
V M
H
= pY + δ(1 − ǫ)p¯BH ; (51)
By definition VO ≥ −kO+p¯A(µOO)+δkR. Together with the fact that p¯A(µOO) ≥ p¯AL,
this means that kO + VO ≥ p¯AL + δkR. Also, note that p¯BL = θL ≤ pO. We can now
rewrite V R
L
and V M
L
as
V R
L
= −kR + p¯AH + δǫkR + δ(1− ǫ)(kR + VO) ; (52)
V M
L
= pY + δ(1 − ǫ)VO . (53)
Optimality requires V R
H
≥ V M
H
. Using (50) and (51), this can be rewritten as
(1− δ)kR ≤ p¯AH −
[
pY + δ(1 − ǫ)p¯BH
1 + δ(1 − ǫ)
]
. (54)
Since p¯BH = θBH > pY by the first result, (54) leads to (1 − δ)kR < p¯AH − pY . For
L-pros not to buy practices we need V ML ≥ V
R
L . Using (52) and (53), this can be
rewritten as (1 − δ)kR ≥ p¯AH − pY . Thus we have a contradiction. This establishes
that we cannot have an efficient equilibrium that is robust to the ǫ-shock.
Proof of Theorem 5. We will show that the equilibrium described in Part II of
the proof of Theorem 3 is robust, by slightly modifying some of its quantities to
account for the ǫ-shock. Note that as ǫ tends to zero, all the quantities in this proof
tend to their counterparts in the proof of Theorem 3. Each period nRH young H-pros
and nRL young L-pros buy practices from retiring pros, while n
O
H young H-pros and
nO
L
young L-pros buy practices from old pros, where nR
H
is given by (42), and
nRL = q(1− ǫ)− n
R
H ; (55)
nO
H
= q − nR
H
; (56)
nO
L
= ψA − 3q + 2ǫq + n
R
H
. (57)
These quantities are all positive (for ǫ small enough). Old pros never buy practices.
H-pros keep their practices for two periods (unless they are forced to leave), and
L-pros who buy practices sell them when they are old. Each period, the number of
old pros who sell their practices is (nRL +n
O
L)+ ǫ(n
R
H +n
O
H); this is equal to n
O
H +n
O
L ,
the number who buy practices from old pros. The number of retiring pros who sell
practices is (1− ǫ)(nRH +n
O
H); this is equal to n
R
H+n
R
L , the number who buy practices
from retiring pros. The total number of practices is (2−ǫ)(nRH+n
O
H)+(n
R
L+n
O
L) = ψA.
Client beliefs are now
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µY R =
nRH
(1− ǫ)q
; µYO =
q − nRH
ψA − 2q + 2ǫq
, (58)
and µOR = µOO = 0. Market prices and proportions are the same as before. Prac-
tice prices are again given by (46) and (47), but with the new beliefs. Optimality
conditions (48) and (49) are satisfied, for ǫ small enough. All equilibrium conditions
are met; and in particular there are buyers for the practices sold by shock-affected
professionals, therefore the equilibrium is robust. Since all q young H-pros and all
(1− ǫ)q surviving old H-pros own practices, the equilibrium is efficient.
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose ψA ≤ 2q. Then an equilibrium exists, as follows.
Each period nRH young H-pros buy practices from retiring pros, and n
O
H buy them
from old pros, where
nRH =
(
1− ǫ
2− ǫ
)
ψA and n
O
H =
(
ǫ
2− ǫ
)
ψA . (59)
No one else buys practices. Those who buy practices keep them for two periods,
except when affected by the shock. At the end of each practice phase, nR
H
+ nO
H
young pros and (1− ǫ)(nR
H
+nO
H
) old pros own practices, making the total ψA. That
is, all A-clients are in practices. A measure (1 − ǫ)(nR
H
+ nO
H
) are sold by retiring
pros; this is equal to nRH. A measure ǫ(n
R
H + n
O
H) are sold by old pros, i.e. those
practice-owners who are forced to leave; this is equal to nOH. So practice markets
clear.
Client beliefs are µY R = µY O = 1 and µOR = µOO = 0. Any young H-pros not
buying practices go on the market. They form of a proportion qY of young pros on
the market, with
qY =
q − nRH − n
O
H
1− nRH − n
O
H
=
(2− ǫ)q − ψA
2− ǫ− ψA
. (60)
For ǫ small enough, this is well-defined and positive, since ψA < 2q. As for old pros,
we have qO = 0. Market prices are pY = qY θBH +(1− qY )θL and pO = θL. Threshold
prices are p¯AH = qY θBH + (1 − qY )θAH , p¯BH = θBH , p¯AL = θL − qY (θAH − θBH) and
p¯BL = θL.
Let practice prices be
kR = kO = (1− qY )
[
(θAH − θL) + δ(1 − ǫ)(θAH − θBH)
1− δ2(1− ǫ)− δǫ(1 − τ)
]
(61)
Then it is straightforward to verify that
V MH = V
R
H = V
O
H ; (62)
V ML ≥ V
R
L = V
O
L ; (63)
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the latter with strict inequality if (36) is satisfied strictly. We can also verify that old
pros have no incentive to buy or sell practices (unless forced to leave the economy).
Thus the behaviour described above is optimal. The equilibrium is efficient, since
all A-clients are in practices owned by H-pros. It is robust, since it takes the shock
into account.
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